Japan used to obtain around 26% of its
electricity from its 54 nuclear plants. After Fukushima in March 2011, with
opposition to nuclear widespread, all its nuclear power reactors were shutdown
in sequence for safety checks, reviews and upgrades. Local prefectures, who in
theory have the last say, resisted moves to restart them. So by May 2012 Japan
had become nuclear free. But with the summer air-conditioning load looming,
there were pressures to restart two of Kansai Electrical Power Co’s plants in
the Western Fukui area, despite the very strong national opposition- thousands
of people took to the streets in protest. Prime minister Yoshihiko Noda said
‘We should restart the Ohi No. 3 and No. 4 reactors in order to protect the
people's livelihoods. Japanese society cannot survive if we stop all nuclear
reactors or keep them halted.’
He insisted that new safety measures would
ensure the two reactors would not leak radiation if an earthquake or tsunami as
severe as at Fukushima should strike them. However, while some of the main
measures to secure cooling functions and prevent meltdowns as in Fukushima had
been installed, more than a third of the necessary upgrades on the list were
still incomplete- the full upgrades may take up to three years.
Nevertheless local governor Issei
Nishikawa evidently indicated
approval for a restart: the Fukui region has the largest nuclear plant
concentration in the country (13 reactors) and is heavily dependent on them for
energy and employment. According a report in WISE/ NIRN’s Nuclear Monitor 751,
there had been intense lobbying of political leaders by Kansai Electric Power
Co (Kepco) and threats by major corporate supporters to relocate outside the
region were cited by the Union of Kansai Governments as reasons for caving in.
Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto admitted defeat but said he had done all he could.
Kepco evidently put a lot of pressure on companies in the region, telling them
that without the Oi reactors, they would face rolling blackouts. Those firms,
in turn, pressured local politicians, saying that if there were blackouts they
would have to relocate outside the region.
Noda said the startup was not intended just
for the summer, rejecting calls for limited operation by Osaka city and other
nearby towns: ‘the livelihoods and daily lives of the Japanese people cannot be
sustained if reactors are only restarted for the summer.’ He said he planned to
start up more reactors whenever their safety was confirmed. At the same time,
he confirmed that the government would be producing a national energy plan,
although it was delayed from June to August. Presumably he wanted the initial start up in place to prepare
the political climate for a less anti nuclear plan. And, despite a lot of
protest, he got his way- the go ahead for the two Ohi plants to start up came in late June and they reached full power in July.
So the nuclear-free honeymoon period is
over. It would certainly have been hard for Japan to run without some extra
input. Even with its full nuclear
compliment, it was highly dependent on energy imports; it imported around 80%
of its energy mostly coal and oil
(and of course uranium). But it had made good progress in cutting demand
through emergency energy saving efforts, and given time renewables could be
ramped up to take over most electricity and heat supply. Certainly it is trying to develop an
alternative approach, based on energy efficiency and a major commitment to
renewables, including a new quite generous Feed-In Tariff for PV solar, a 1GW
off shore wind programme and more support for other marine renewables- offshore
projects obviously make sense in a country where land is at a premium.
In August a consultation report emerged,
based on the three options that the government had put forward - zero nuclear,
15% nuclear or 20-25% nuclear, with renewables taking up most the slack, at
30-35%. Early indications were
that most of the public backed the zero nuclear option. And in Sep, the government announced
that it was aiming to get to zero nuclear ‘in the 2030s’. Given that Japan was
originally planning to expand
nuclear from its pre Fukushima 26% to 45% of total electricity, that’s a big shift- but at what a huge financial and social cost, not
least to the thousands of evacuees still unable to return home.
Their plight was revealed in a survey by
the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee for the
Japanese Diet found. Over 10,000
local resident responded, some very bitterly. The survey found that delays in
passing on information meant that awareness of the accident was initially very
low amongst residents. Some residents did not realise they were being evacuated
from their homes because of a nuclear accident and might not be able to return
for a long time. Many reported fleeing in just the clothes they had on, without
taking time to gather valuables, medical records or even to lock their homes,
with some thinking they were being evacuated because of the risk of a further
tsunami. Evacuation orders were issued firstly for a zone close to the plant,
the next day the evacuation zone was increased to 10 km, then 20 km, and
finally the government requested voluntary evacuation for residents 20-30 km
from the plant. Some ended up having to move several (4-6+) times, some into
areas which turned out to be more contaminated. Many respondents referred to TV
reports that there were no immediate health risks. So now evacuees
didn’t trust the media or assurances that they could return. Residents said they had often
been assured of the safety of nuclear power, and thought that an accident could
never occur. Now they know better.
But life goes on. Japanese company Softbank
Mobile’s Sharp Pantone 5 107SH smart phone has a gamma radiation monitor
app. Lets hope it’s not need
in future. The interim ‘zero nuclear in /by the 2030s’ position is a
little vague- that could mean up to 2039! And it’s far enough
away to allow for backsliding…
The full Fukushima story is covered in a
book I’ve produced as part of
Palgrave Macmillan’s new Pivot e-book initiative. Out at the end of October: ‘Fukushima: impacts and implications’.
